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Appellants respectfully petition the court for a 
rehearing of that portion of the case which pertains to appellants' 
claim against respondents for the monies placed on deposit and 
otherwise invested in Grove Finance once the cease and desist order 
had been issued by the respondents. This matter was not specifi-
cally addressed by the opinion issued in this case and appears to 
be a matter which is outside the scope of the case of Gillman v. 
Department of Financial Institutions, 120 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1989), 
cited Ky the court. This petition is submitted in good faith and 
not for delay. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ACT OF ENFORCING A CEASE AND DESIST ORDER 
IS DIFFERENT THAN SUSPENDING OR REVOKING A LICENSE 
In the instant case, this court has now ruled that 
governmental immunity protects the respondents from suit because 
the conduct complained of by appellants related to a failure to 
suspend or revocate Grove Finance's license. While that may be 
true of a majority of appellants' claims, a certain number of the 
appellants had, as an additional cause of action against respon-
dents, a claim that during the period from the time the cease and 
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desist order was issued by respondents on April 8, 1980 until the 
bankruptcy of Grove Finance in August of 1980 (or at least until 
the takeover of Grove Finance by respondents in late July), 
respondents allowed Grove Finance to take money on deposit and 
otherwise engage in activities in specific contravention of the 
cease and desist order. (See Appellants' Brief at page 25 and 
appellant Hilton's amended complaint, Third Cause of Action.) 
Admittedly not all of the appellants can allege this cause of 
action and the amount so received by Grove Finance which would be 
claimed as damages in this case is a very small portion of the 
monies claimed in the total lawsuit. Nevertheless, this specific 
claim deserves to be addressed because it represents a separate 
cause of action. It appears that this court, in making its ruling, 
overlooked this small but important claim. 
There is a major difference between a governmental agency 
on the one hand making a decision whether and to what extent to 
suspend or revoke a financial institution's license and on the 
other hand to enforce its own order. Once the decision was made 
by respondents that Grove Finance was improperly and illegally 
taking funds on deposit, it entered a cease and desist order. For 
reasons of its own, it did not make the cease and desist order 
public. The only way, therefore, that the public (for whose 
benefit the cease and desist order was issued) would be protected 
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would be for respondents to undertake such actions as to make 
certain that the cease and desist order was enforced. It is the 
allegation of appellants that respondents did not do that. Rather, 
even with the cease and desist order in place, officials of Grove 
Finance took monies on deposit from some of the appellants and 
continued to violate the cease and desist order until on July 18, 
1980 (over three months later) when respondents took possession of 
Grove Finance. During this period of more than three months, some 
appellants placed additional monies or new monies on deposit with 
Grove Finance. 
To enforce the cease and desist order did not require a 
determination of suspending or revoking a license. Rather it could 
have been accomplished in a myriad of ways. Among other things, 
respondents could have placed personnel in Grove Finance's offices 
to personally prevent any more monies from being placed with Grove 
Finance in exchange for a Grove Finance obligation. Respondents 
could have also posted a notice on the premises informing the 
public that, until further notice, Grove Finance was not permitted 
to take monies on deposit or otherwise receive monies in exchange 
for obligations of Grove Finance. Respondents could also have 
imposed a series of fines every time a violation was detected. In 
other words, once the cease and desist order was issued, it did not 
require respondents to shut down Grove Finance but rather it 
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required respondents to enforce the order. As it was, respondents 
imposed the cease and desist order and then completely failed to 
enforce the order. At the same time the public was not informed 
as to the existence of the cease and desist order and therefore 
during the three month period certain of the appellants continued 
to make deposits and otherwise provide money to Grove Finance in 
exchange for obligations of Grove. Since appellants claim that 
respondents were negligent in this regard, they should be permitted 
to go to trial on the issue. 
POINT II 
ENFORCEMENT OF THE CEASE AND DESIST ORDER WAS MINISTERIAL 
The definition of ministerial versus discretionary 
governmental functions is well briefed in appellants' briefs. 
Suffice it to say, once the cease and desist order was in place, 
i.e., once the discretionary decision had been made to issue a 
cease and desist order, thereafter the enforcement of the cease and 
desist order was ministerial. The instructions were clear - Grove 
Finance was ordered not to undertake activities which would bring 
monies or other assets into Grove Finance in exchange for Grove 
obligations. That was an order without discretion and respondents 
had the duty to enforce it. They did not and so should be held 
liable for the damages incurred by appellants as a direct result. 
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Therefore, there has been a waiver of governmental immunity for the 
respondents' negligent conduct as to that aspect of the case. 
The claim of appellants in this regard is virtually 
identical to the facts in the case of Little v. Utah State Division 
of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49 (1983). In that case this court 
determined that the Division of Family Services had the discretion-
ary right to determine whether a particular individual was a 
candidate for a foster care program. However, once they determined 
that the child was such a candidate, then this court held that the 
governmental agency had a ministerial duty to make certain that the 
child was properly cared for. The failure to properly care for the 
child resulting in the child's death became the basis for the 
lawsuit and this court held that immunity had been waived. 
Assuming that the decision to place Jennifer 
in a foster home was a discretionary one, once 
that decision was made and the placement 
occurred, the question was no longer whether 
the child was to receive foster care but 
whether due care was exercised under a duty 
assumed. Where a breach of that duty can be 
shown, the government is held to the same 
standard as private individuals and cannot 
cloak itself with the mantle of discretion. 
Id. at 51. 
In like vein, respondents could use their discretion to determine 
whether a cease and desist order should be imposed, but once having 
so exercised that discretion, they had a duty to enforce the order. 
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Their negligent conduct in failing to do so gives rise to a waiver 
of immunity, 
SUMMARY 
Even under the authority of Gillman, supra governmental 
immunity does not shield the respondents under those circumstances 
where the remedy is other than revoking or suspending the license 
and a ministerial act is involved. It is submitted that this court 
has overlooked the specific claim of appellants with regard to 
respondents' failure to enforce its cease and desist order. 
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the District Court with 
instructions to permit trial on the issue of respondents' negli-
gence in failing to enforce the cease and desist order. 
DATED this 3 0 day of November, 1989. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KESLER & RUST 
JC/SlSPH £ . RUST 
V At torney for Appe l l an t s 
j rpethearing.hil. 
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